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INTRODUCTION
The theme of this symposium is the “new territorialism” in the
U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions.  The reach of the United
States’ jurisdiction over conduct and entities physically situated
outside the geographic bounds of the United States has recently
cropped up in a wide range of areas, including personal jurisdiction
over foreign corporations for ordinary torts1 and human rights
abuses,2 constitutional habeas jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay in
† Professor of Law & Warren Christopher Professor in the Practice of International
Law and Diplomacy, Stanford Law School.  The author thanks the organizers and partici-
pants in this symposium for the lively interchange on these timely and important topics.
The author also thanks Thomas Fu for research assistance, and her colleague and office
neighbor Robert Gordon for pointing out Moorfield Storey’s involvement in American
Banana.
1 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2855 (2011)
(finding no personal jurisdiction in tort lawsuit concerning accident in France); J. McIn-
tyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (finding no personal jurisdiction
in a tort lawsuit against an English manufacturer).
2 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750–51 (2014) (finding no jurisdiction
in suit against Daimler for human rights violations occurring in Argentina against Argen-
tine citizens).
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Cuba,3 and the application of federal statutes to conduct abroad.4
Many observers, including most of the contributors to this sympo-
sium,5 have discerned in these decisions a renewed emphasis on terri-
tory as a limiting principle for legal authority.
Territorialism is, of course, not “new” in the law, and thus one
interesting question is how the “new” territorialism compares to the
“old” territorialism.  This Essay explores the issue through the lens of
a set of important cases about territoriality from the first decade of the
twentieth century—American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.6 and the
Insular Cases.7 In American Banana, the Court announced what has
come to be known as the presumption against extraterritoriality in the
application of federal statutes; in the Insular Cases, the Court deter-
mined that the Constitution does not always “follow the flag” and con-
cluded that inhabitants of the territories acquired by the United States
in the Spanish-American War of 1898 were not entitled to a full pano-
ply of constitutional rights.8
This Essay situates these cases in the broader social and political
context of debates in the early twentieth century about American for-
eign policy, imperialism, and law.  This Essay also explores the curious
fact that one prominent lawyer—Moorfield Storey (more famous as
the first president of the NAACP)—was involved in both sets of cases,
first as a leader of the Anti-Imperialist Society criticizing the Court’s
3 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
4 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013) (rejecting
recognition of cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute in lawsuit against foreign cor-
porations for aiding and abetting human rights violations in Nigeria); Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875 (2010) (determining that § 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act does not provide a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and
American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign
exchanges).
5 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come
Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2014); Juliet M. Moringiello & William J. Reynolds, The
New Territorialism in the Not-So-New Frontier of Cyberspace, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1415 (2014);
Louise Weinberg, What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk About Extraterritoriality: Kiobel and
the Conflict of Laws, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1471 (2014).
6 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
7 There is not universal agreement on which cases fall within the rubric of the “Insu-
lar Cases,” but most scholars include the seven cases decided on May 27, 1901: De Lima v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Crossman v.
United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States (Dooley I ), 182 U.S. 222 (1901);
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
Huus v. New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); as well as two cases
decided on December 2, 1901: Dooley v. United States (Dooley II ), 183 U.S. 151 (1901),
and Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901).
8 Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 356 (“[T]he general and almost universal rule is that
the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done.”); see, e.g., Dooley I, 182 U.S. at 230–31 (“We . . . do not look
to the Constitution or political institutions of the conquerer, for authority to establish a
government for the [conquered] territory . . . during its military occupation, nor for the
rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited.”).
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refusal to extend constitutional protections in the Insular Cases and
then as a lawyer for the United Fruit Company arguing against extra-
territorial application of U.S. antitrust laws to that company’s actions
in Central America.9  Together, the Supreme Court’s decisions in
these cases represent the resolution, at a particular moment in time,
of recurring legal and political debates over forms of empire and the
role of public and private actors in the projection of power across ter-
ritory (a controversy that dates to the exploits of the great trading
companies of the early modern period and continues today).
The Insular Cases suggested a legal framework for colonial occu-
pation of distant lands by the United States, a prospect alarming to
those at the time who thought empire was inconsistent with the basic
character of a democratic republic.  But in the end, the territories in
those cases remained exceptional, and the United States never made a
habit of permanently occupying new foreign territories as a colonial
power.10  Instead, the United States chose to exercise its extraterrito-
rial influence through business, diplomacy, and military force—
including episodes of transient military occupation.11  The literal
holding of American Banana about the territorial scope of the antitrust
statutes was eventually eroded by later decisions, but the presumption
against extraterritoriality that the case relied upon has had continuing
influence.  The path chosen in these cases ultimately helped preserve
America’s vision of itself as a republic, not an empire, but had conse-
quences that were perhaps not fully anticipated.12
The decisions in American Banana and the Insular Cases are more
than historical curiosities, for the Supreme Court relied upon the le-
gal theories these cases developed in its recent decisions in two of the
“new territorialism” cases: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and
Boumediene v. Bush.  In Kiobel, the majority applied the presumption
against extraterritoriality to find that claims against foreign corpora-
tions for human rights abuses in Nigeria were not cognizable in U.S.
courts under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).13  In Boumediene, the Court
cited the Insular Cases in concluding that the privilege of habeas
9 See Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 352 (identifying Storey as a writer of United Fruit’s
brief); WILLIAM B. HIXSON, JR., MOORFIELD STOREY AND THE ABOLITIONIST TRADITION 67
(1972) (noting Storey’s criticism of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Insular Cases).
10 See BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERI-
CAN EMPIRE 230–31 (2006) (describing the American transition from possessing new terri-
tory to working with supportive regimes).
11 See id. (“It was more convenient for both the White House . . . and for U.S. compa-
nies trading with or investing in foreign countries, to use diplomatic, economic, and mili-
tary levers to effect their objectives rather than to annex new areas . . . .”).
12 See id. at 252–53 (describing the view of the United States as a “‘Federal Empire’—
that is, one ruled by the component states and their representatives”).
13 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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corpus, though perhaps not all constitutional rights, applied to de-
tainees in U.S. custody at Guantanamo.14
As at the turn of the last century, Boumediene, like the Insular
Cases, is the liminal case, of symbolic importance in America’s concep-
tion of itself, but of relatively minor practical significance because of
the few territories and people to which it attaches.  Guantanamo, the
Court’s analysis suggests, is almost sui generis.15  On the other hand
Kiobel, like American Banana, represents a broader and more signifi-
cant theory of American regulatory power in the world, one which
appropriately rejects the idea of an empire even of law.  But that the-
ory comes at the expense of oversight and accountability for the con-
duct of powerful, but nominally private, transnational actors that
operate outside the territorial bounds of any one government.  Over
the course of the twentieth century, colonial empires rooted in con-
trol of territory were appropriately rejected in both international law
and politics.16  But the system of international law focused on state-
hood and territoriality—a system that itself developed in the context
of colonial empire—remains and poses its own problems.  Private
transnational actors fit awkwardly into the system of public interna-
tional law, while continued reliance on notions of territoriality in pri-
vate international law can leave such actors poorly and unevenly
regulated by national governments as well.17  While excessive national
extraterritorial regulation of transnational conduct has costs in terms
of economic efficiency and development, underregulation also has
costs.  The muddled jurisprudence of the Supreme Court’s “new terri-
torialism” is ungrounded in coherent principle and seems unlikely to
aid in achieving the optimal regulation of transnational conduct.
I
TERRITORIALISM, NOW AND THEN
A. The “New Territorialism”
1. Boumediene
Following the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001 and the
ensuing armed conflict in Afghanistan, the U.S. government’s deci-
sion to detain certain prisoners at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo
unleashed a tide of litigation related to the legal status of this small bit
of land and the people on it.18  The American military base at Guanta-
namo has peculiar legal status, remaining formally part of Cuba but
14 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008).
15 See id. at 753–54.
16 See, e.g., infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. R
17 See infra Part II.
18 See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732 (holding that Habeas Suspension Clause of
Constitution applies to detainees at Guantanamo Bay); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470
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controlled entirely by the United States under a perpetual lease
(which itself arose out of the settlement of issues concerning the
United States’ occupation of Cuba at the end of the Spanish-American
war).19  Comforted by earlier precedents indicating that the base’s lo-
cation outside the territorial United States would exclude it from the
jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts,20 the government initially asserted
that Guantanamo was essentially a law-free zone.21  In 2004, the Su-
preme Court found in Rasul v. Bush that the federal habeas statute
covered persons detained at Guantanamo.22  Following congressional
efforts to withdraw the habeas statute’s application, in Boumediene the
Court determined that the Guantanamo prisoners had a constitu-
tional right to habeas protected by the Habeas Suspension Clause.23
In Boumediene, the Court took a pragmatic and functional ap-
proach to determining the territorial reach of the Suspension
Clause.24  The Court began by reviewing the parties’ arguments about
the historical scope of habeas jurisdiction in English courts and ob-
served that “the evidence as to the geographic scope of the [habeas]
writ at common law [is] informative, but . . . not dispositive.”25  Find-
ing no clear answer in the history, the Court indicated that it would
not look mechanically at formal territorial sovereignty but functionally
at the “degree of control the Nation asserts over foreign territory.”26
In canvassing the relevant precedents, the Court took particular
note of the Insular Cases, which (as noted) had concerned the applica-
tion of various constitutional provisions to the island territories ac-
quired by the United States in the Spanish-American War of 1898.
(2004) (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by for-
eign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay under general habeas statute).
19 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753.
20 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950) (determining that U.S. federal
courts should not review challenges to war crimes convictions of German prisoners of war
held and convicted by U.S. military in occupied Germany for violations of law of war in
China). Cf. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (“Acts of Congress
normally do not have extraterritorial application unless such an intent is clearly
manifested.”).
21 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739 (describing the government’s argument that nonci-
tizens designated as enemy combatants and detained in territory outside the borders of the
United States have no constitutional rights and no right to habeas corpus).
22 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).
23 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
24 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764 (“[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective
factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”).
25 Id. at 748.
26 Id. at 754; see also id. at 770–71 (“It is true that before today the Court has never
held that noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another country
maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution.  But the cases before
us lack any precise historical parallel.”).
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The Boumediene Court explained that, while
noting the inherent practical difficulties of enforcing all constitu-
tional provisions “always and everywhere,” . . . the Court devised in
the Insular Cases a doctrine that allowed it to use its power sparingly
and where it would be most needed.  This century-old doctrine in-
forms our analysis in the present matter.27
Which is another way of saying that no entirely coherent principle
undergirds the odd zig-zag of rights recognized in the Insular Cases
and that the Court would again be stingy about explaining the ratio-
nale for its decision, lest the precedent prove too much in future
cases.  Ultimately, the Court made sparing use of its power in
Boumediene.  It answered a very narrow question, finding only that the
Suspension Clause applied to Guantanamo—and leaving open nu-
merous other questions such as what other constitutional provisions
might apply to Guantanamo (for example, criminal trial rights) and
whether the Suspension Clause applied to other places where the U.S.
military was involved in the detention of prisoners (for example, in
Afghanistan).28  Since Boumediene, the lower courts have struggled
with these issues,29 but the Supreme Court has declined to hear fur-
ther cases.  Thus, Boumediene stands as an important symbolic decision
but one of uncertain practical importance in a world where the
United States holds very little territory in the way it holds
Guantanamo.
2. Kiobel
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. involved claims that Shell (in
the form of Dutch and British parent corporations and their Nigerian
subsidiary) had aided and abetted human rights violations by the
Nigerian government in the territory of Nigeria.  The plaintiffs in the
case, who had received asylum and were residing in the United States,
brought suit against Shell in federal court in New York under the ATS.
They alleged that the Nigerian government had engaged in arbitrary
detention, killings, torture, and other crimes against humanity in sup-
pressing the activities of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People, which had protested against Shell’s petroleum extraction op-
erations in the Ogoni region of the Niger Delta.30  A divided majority
27 Id. at 759 (citation omitted).
28 See id. at 770–71 (examining details and context of U.S. control over Guantanamo
before determining that Habeas Suspension Clause applies there).
29 See, e.g., Maqaleh v. Hagel, 738 F.3d 312, 317 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that Habeas
Suspension Clause did not extend to foreign nationals held by U.S. military at base in
Afghanistan).
30 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013).  For a general
discussion of violence associated with extractive industries, see Robert Dufresne, The Opac-
ity of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal Violence, and International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
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of the Second Circuit held that “offenses against the law of nations
(i.e., customary international law) for violations of human rights can
be charged against States and against individual men and women but
not against juridical persons such as corporations.”31  The Second Cir-
cuit majority found that the “subjects of international law” are prima-
rily states and that “[t]he singular achievement of international law
since the Second World War has come in the area of human rights,
where the subjects of customary international law—i.e., those with in-
ternational rights, duties, and liabilities—now include not merely
states, but also individuals,” but not juridical persons such as corpora-
tions.32  In the Second Circuit’s view, corporations are largely invisible
to international law, except in a few instances where states have made
the choice through specific treaties explicitly to apply rules of conduct
to corporations.33
When the Supreme Court initially agreed to hear the case, the
main issue appeared to be Shell’s argument that international human
rights law applied only to states and natural persons, not corpora-
tions—a question of public international law.34  But at the first oral
argument in the case, the Court seemed ill-inclined to answer this
question (perhaps lest it appear too greatly to favor corporations by
granting them rights but not responsibilities).35  The Court thus
turned its attention to an issue raised in amicus briefs about the terri-
torial scope of the ATS—a question of what is classically termed pri-
vate international law, or conflict of laws.36  The Court set the case
down for additional briefing and reargument on “whether and under
331, 332–33 (2004).  Dufresne notes that “[b]eyond oil-motivated interstate use of force,
the petroleum industry is also entangled in another form of violence, generally involving
small-scale episodic and highly localized operations.  This form of violence is located on or
around resource exploitation concessions.  It is aimed at keeping or gaining control over
these resources, repressing manifestations of local discontent in the resource-rich areas
and along transportation routes, or at extorting money by conducting nuisance operations
involving kidnapping or vandalism.”  Dufresne suggests that greater attention be paid to
“situations in which the violent struggle for the control of the resource-based economy is
not framed in statal terms, but rather takes place within a state’s borders, without challeng-
ing that state’s formal title to the territory.”
31 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (2013).
32 Id. at 118.
33 Id. at 138 (discussing various international treaties that apply rules of conduct to
corporations, but suggesting that such treaties have limited value in the context of evaluat-
ing human rights obligations).
34 See Brief for Respondents at 2–3, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/01/4573517_1_10-1491-Kiobel-v.-Royal-Dutch-Petroleum-Co.-Brief-for-Re
spondents-AS-FILED.pdf.
35 Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (recognizing a corporate free
speech right).
36 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).
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what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows
courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of na-
tions occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States.”37
Following reargument, the Court held in favor of Shell, ruling
that claims cognizable under the ATS must “touch and concern the
territory” of the United States, though the Court left ambiguous the
ways in which claims might do that.38  In so holding, the Court ac-
cepted arguments based “primarily on a canon of statutory interpreta-
tion known as the presumption against extraterritorial application,”
which provides that “ ‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none,’”39 and purportedly reflects
the “‘presumption that United States law governs domestically but
does not rule the world.’”40  This anti-imperialist language perhaps
unconsciously evokes the rhetoric of the Court in American Banana
itself, though the Court noted that the ATS, as a jurisdictional statute,
does not fit squarely within the canon against extraterritoriality be-
cause it does not “directly regulate conduct or afford relief”; but the
Court nevertheless found that the principles underlying the canon of
interpretation should similarly constrain courts considering causes of
action that can be brought under the ATS.41  Noting that “[o]n these
facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States”
and that “even where the claims touch and concern the territory of
the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application,” the Court observed
that “[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it would
reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.”42  Accord-
ingly, the Court held that “petitioners’ case seeking relief for viola-
tions of the law of nations occurring outside the United States is
barred.”43
In concurrence, Justice Kennedy observed that “[t]he opinion for
the Court is careful to leave open a number of significant questions
37 Order for Additional Briefing and Reargument of Case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Pe-
troleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/10-1491-order-rearg-3-5-12.pdf.
38 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
39 Id. at 1664 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878
(2010)).
40 Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1669.
43 Id.
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regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute” and
that
[o]ther cases may arise with allegations of serious violations of inter-
national law principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by
the [Torture Victim Protection Act] nor by the reasoning and hold-
ing of today’s case; and in those disputes the proper implementa-
tion of the presumption against extraterritorial application may
require some further elaboration and explanation.44
Left largely unexplored in the majority opinion was the fact that the
conduct-regulating norms at issue in the case were based on public
international law and not confined to the territory of any one nation.
B. The “Old Territorialism”
The Boumediene and Kiobel cases are oddly similar to another set of
cases a century earlier—the Insular Cases and the American Banana
case.  The connection between these sets of cases is not merely a mat-
ter of factual similarity but also a matter of legal precedent, for as
noted these earlier cases are, in fact, the key precedents for the doc-
trines on which the later cases rely.  This subpart explores the social,
legal, and political context of the earlier cases to gain insight into the
view of territoriality and empire that they exemplified, while the final
Part suggests implications of this view for today.
1. The Insular Cases
At the dawn of the twentieth century, one of the most conten-
tious issues in American politics was whether America should expand
to occupy and govern territories over the seas and, if so, what the legal
status of those territories should be.45  Given that the United States
began its political life as a set of colonies breaking free from empire
and claiming the right to self-governance, the issue was closely entan-
gled with the country’s conception of itself and its political commit-
44 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, concurred in the result.  They would not have relied on the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality, given that it  “ ‘rests on the perception that Congress
ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters,’” and the ATS “was en-
acted with ‘foreign matters’ in mind.” Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
45 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories and
the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 208–09,
230–39 (2002) (discussing the role of debates over imperialism in the reelection of Presi-
dent William McKinley in 1900 and the Insular Cases, noting that the Court concluded
“that the status of [U.S.] territories was largely a political question dedicated to Congress
and that only fundamental constitutional protections applied . . . [which] left the govern-
ance of U.S. overseas territories largely in an extraconstitutional zone”).
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ments.46  The Spanish-American War of 1898 began in connection
with support for Cuban independence from Spain but ended with the
United States in possession of not only Cuba (to which the United
States promised and ultimately gave formal independence in 1902—
though retaining a variety of powers including the perpetual lease
over Guantanamo under a 1903 agreement) but also the Philippines,
Guam, and Puerto Rico.47
Unlike the former territories of the western part of the North
American continent, these island territories were not destined for
statehood, based on the political elite’s perception of their geography,
racial composition, and culture.48  Opponents of this foreign policy
viewed the occupation of these islands as an unwise foray by the
United States into building a colonial territorial empire like those of
European nations.49  Opposition crystallized around trying to block
ratification of the peace treaty granting the territory of the Philippines
to the United States.  A group called the Anti-Imperialist League led
the campaign and had as members many prominent figures including
former president Grover Cleveland, wealthy industrialist Andrew Car-
negie, Stanford University president David Starr Jordan, labor leader
Samuel Gompers, author Mark Twain, and prominent Boston lawyer
Moorfield Storey—to whom this Essay will return shortly.50
46 See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLU-
TION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 4 (2009) (“At stake . . . was the self-conception of
the United States as a constitutional republic.”); Cleveland, supra note 45, at 166–67 (not-
ing that, initially, “the United States’ recent experience as colonial subjects made interna-
tional law principles of colonial governance particularly abhorrent to American political
ideology” and discussing international political and legal thought on colonialism from
Blackstone in the seventeenth century through Oppenheim in the early twentieth
century).
47 See Cleveland, supra note 45 at 208–12 (“In 1899, the United States acquired the
Insular territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, and established a protector-
ate over Cuba as a result of the Spanish American War . . . .  The Spanish-American War
had been fought ostensibly to liberate the Cuban people from the abhorrent conditions
under which they were held by Spain . . . .”).
48 See id. at 208–11 (noting that the elites of the 1890s considered the inhabitants of
“far-flung territories” to be “culturally and racially inferior” and that the Senate passed a
resolution stating that the treaty with Spain would not lead to statehood for the
Philippines).
49 See, e.g., RAUSTIALA, supra note 46, at 4 (discussing the imperialist/anti-imperialist
debate surrounding the 1900 presidential election); William Jennings Bryan, Mr. Bryan’s
Speech of Acceptance at Military Park, Indianapolis, Ind., Aug. 8, 1900, in OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS
OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION HELD IN KANSAS CITY, MO., JULY 4TH, 5TH, AND
6TH, 1900, at , 205–27 (1900) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION] (speaking
against imperialism resulting from the Spanish-American War in a speech concerning the
Philippines).
50 See Anti-Imperialist League Collected Records, 1899–1919, SWARTHMORE COLLEGE PEACE
COLLECTION (June 23, 2010), http://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/CDGA.A-L/anti-
imperialistleague.htm (providing a historical background of the Anti-Imperialist League);
infra Part I.B.2.
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Despite this vocal opposition, the U.S. Senate narrowly approved
the treaty annexing the Philippines in February 1899.51  But the oppo-
nents of territorial annexation would not so easily give up, and the
debate continued through the next presidential election in 1900.  In-
deed, the issue was a central focus of the election, with the Demo-
cratic challenger William Jennings Bryan opposing the incumbent
Republican William McKinley’s expansionist foreign policy.52  The
Democratic Party platform in that year stated:
We hold that the Constitution follows the flag, and denounce the
doctrine that an Executive or Congress deriving their existence and
their powers from the Constitution can exercise lawful authority be-
yond it, or in violation of it. . . .  [I]mperialism abroad will lead
quickly and inevitably to despotism at home.53
In the end, McKinley won the election and the United States kept
hold of its new islands.  Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court consid-
ered a set of cases that would come to be known as the Insular Cases,
concerning the application of the Constitution to the newly acquired
territories.54  This sequence of events prompted one political satirist
to famously observe that “no matter whether th’ constitution follows
th’ flag or not, th’ supreme coort follows th’ iliction returns.”55
In one of the most important decisions,56 Downes v. Bidwell, the
Supreme Court considered a challenge under the Constitution’s Uni-
formity Clause57 to the collection of duties on imports from Puerto
Rico to New York.  By a vote of five to four, the Court rejected the
challenge.  The majority conceived of Puerto Rico as “a territory ap-
51 See The Philippine-American War, 1899–1902, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE
HISTORIAN (last visited Mar. 25, 2014), http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/war
(discussing Senate ratification of the treaty for the annexation of the Philippines in the
context of the Philippine-American War).
52 See, e.g., RAUSTIALA, supra note 46, at 4; Bryan, supra note 49, at 205–27. R
53 Second Day, Afternoon Session, Platform, in DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, supra
note 49, at 113–14.
54 See generally SPARROW, supra note 10, at 79–110 (recounting the debate over applica-
tion of U.S. constitutional provisions to new U.S. territories acquired after the Spanish-
American War).
55 FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1906); see also William Mishler &
Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of
Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 87 (1993) (quoting
Finley Peter Dunne’s character Mr. Dooley).
56 See Christina Duffy Burnett (Ponsa) & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the
Domestic: The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in FOREIGN IN A DO-
MESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 1, 7 (Christina
Duffy Burnett (Ponsa) & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) (“Downes v. Bidwell [is] generally con-
sidered the most important of the Insular Cases . . . .”).  Christina Duffy Ponsa was previ-
ously known as Christina Duffy Burnett. See Christina Duffy Ponsa, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL
(last visited Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Christina_Ponsa.
57 The Clause provides that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform through-
out the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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purtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the
United States,” cautioning that “[a] false step at this time might be
fatal to the development of what Chief Justice Marshall called the
American Empire.”58  As Justice White put it in a concurring opinion,
Puerto Rico was “foreign to the United States in a domestic sense.”59
Reflecting the other side of the debate, in dissent, Justice Harlan
argued:
We heard much in argument about the “expanding future of our
country.”  It was said that the United States is to become what is
called a “world power;” and that if this Government intends to keep
abreast of the times and be equal to the great destiny that awaits the
American people, it must be allowed to exert all the power that
other nations are accustomed to exercise.  My answer is, that the
fathers never intended that the authority and influence of this na-
tion should be exerted otherwise than in accordance with the
Constitution.60
In the end, the Court attempted to weave a middle course be-
tween the full application of the Constitution to the island territories
and no application at all, carving out the idea of different categories
of territory that would be accorded different treatment pursuant to a
functional rather than a formal approach to sovereignty.  For exam-
ple, in De Lima v. Bidwell,61 the Court held that Puerto Rico was not a
foreign country under the U.S. Tariff Act of 1897.62  Decisions in the
other cases similarly zigged and zagged through technical issues of
statutory and constitutional law, carving out a unique status for the
islands.  Three years later, in Dorr v. United States, which concerned the
right to jury trial in the Philippines, the Court explained that “[t]he
limitations which are to be applied in any given case involving territo-
rial government must depend upon the relation of the particular terri-
tory to the United States, concerning which Congress is exercising the
power conferred by the Constitution.”63  The Court in Dorr found that
the right to jury trial did not extend to the Philippines, suggesting that
while the jury trial right, by its nature, was not suitable for all places
and people,
“Congress in legislating for the Territories would be subject to those
fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are formu-
lated in the Constitution and its amendments; but these limitations
would exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the Consti-
58 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287, 286 (1901).
59 Id. at 341 (White, J., concurring).
60 Id. at 386 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
62 Id. at 200.
63 Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142 (1904).
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tution from which Congress derives all its powers, than by any ex-
press and direct application of its provisions.”64
Collectively, observers suggest that “[t]he Court’s rulings author-
ized the McKinley administration to retain territories without incorpo-
rating them into the United States—in effect, sanctioning the
colonization of Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines.”65  Accord-
ing to the standard account of the Insular Cases, the decisions “served
the turn-of-the-century American imperialist agenda” by stretching “a
republican Constitution to embrace a colonial empire.”66
But, this reading of the cases—while perhaps correct as a doctri-
nal matter—is overly narrow in terms of the cases’ ultimate effects in
reality.  Without meaning to diminish the experiences of the residents
of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam, in the end America’s ex-
periment with territorial colonialism was limited and did not extend
much beyond these islands.  While temporarily occupying other terri-
tories from time to time, the United States did not in the end pursue
territorial occupation as a major component of its approach to inter-
acting with the rest of the world.  Instead of being a late adopter of
the slowly dying form of colonialism that had characterized European
empires, the United States chose to pursue economic engagement
often through private business enterprises (coupled with occasional
military intervention and diplomatic pressure, sometimes in support
of American business interests).67  This strategy had many advantages,
64 Id. at 146 (quoting Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44 (1890)).
65 Krishanti Vignarajah, The Political Roots of Judicial Legitimacy: Explaining the Enduring
Validity of the Insular Cases, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 796 (2010); see also JUAN R. TORRUELLA,
THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 118–33
(1985) (discussing the politico-legal consequences of the Insular Cases); Jose A. Cabranes,
Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional Doctrine, 100 HARV. L. REV. 450, 458–59 (1986) (re-
viewing TORRUELLA, supra: (“[T]he power of Congress to govern ‘territories’ . . . was not
necessarily constrained in the ‘unincorporated’ territories . . . by the constitutional limita-
tions that automatically applied to the states and to the ‘incorporated’ territories . . . .”).
66 Christina Duffy Burnett (Ponsa), Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 800–01 (2005).  Duffy Ponsa disagrees with the stan-
dard account, instead arguing that:
[T]he epochal significance of the cases lies in their careful creation of a
new kind of U.S. territory: a domestic territory that could be governed tem-
porarily, and then later, if necessary, be relinquished.  This was no small
matter for Americans contemplating a global demesne, since the Civil War
had, not so long before, inscribed in blood the indivisibility of the Union;
in the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court ensured that this costly principle
would not bind America to its colonial periphery.  In sum, the Insular Cases
installed a doctrine of territorial deannexation in American constitutional
jurisprudence, and in doing so they created the conditions of possibility for
an American experiment with colonial governance.
Id. at 797.
67 See Erik Gartzke & Dominic Rohner, The Political Economy of Imperialism, Decoloniza-
tion and Development, 41 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 525, 526 (2011) (discussing the shift from
territorial colonialism to a new form of expansion involving “dynamics of systemic struc-
ture, military technology and economic development”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-6\CRN604.txt unknown Seq: 14 22-SEP-14 10:34
1400 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1387
both practical and symbolic, but also disadvantages.  One of those dis-
advantages was that, because of the importance of territoriality as a
legal concept, conduct that took place outside the territory of the
United States, especially conduct by private transnational actors,
sometimes escaped meaningful legal regulation.  The American Ba-
nana v. United Fruit Co. case illustrates this problem.  Ironically, the
triumph of anti-imperialist rhetoric in the courts helped preserve the
United States of America as a republic, but it also helped create the
so-called “banana republics” in Latin America.
2. Moorfield Storey: Anti-Imperialist, Civil Rights Activist, and
Corporate Lawyer
One of the members of the Anti-Imperialist League—and eventu-
ally its chairman—was a man named Moorfield Storey, on whom this
Essay will briefly focus.  His involvement in both the Insular Cases and
American Banana encapsulates the views of a particular segment of
elite American society at the dawn of the twentieth century and re-
flects the compromise approach to empire suggested above, a classi-
cally liberal approach that well-suited America in the twentieth
century.
Storey was a prominent lawyer from an old Boston family, born in
1845 and educated at Harvard.68  He was well known in the profession
and served as President of the American Bar Association in 1896.69
He had complex political views.  On the one hand, his views were simi-
lar to those of many conservative businessman of the day, supporting
the gold standard, free trade, laissez-faire policies, and Lochner-era legal
doctrines of freedom of contract and property rights.70  At the same
time, his parents had been ardent abolitionists,71 and he spoke often
of the influence of the abolitionist movement on his view of civic
life.72  He is perhaps best remembered today as the first president of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) and the lawyer who argued many of the civil rights organiza-
tion’s cases in the Supreme Court in the 1910s and early 1920s.  For
example, as one of the lawyers for the NAACP in Buchanan v. Worley,
he persuaded the Supreme Court that a city ordinance prohibiting
68 See Moorfield Storey, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/naacp/found
ing-and-early-years.html#obj11 (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
69 See id.
70 See HIXSON, supra note 9, at 155–56 (discussing Storey’s sympathies with Progressive R
reform alongside his distrust of federal regulation).
71 See id. at 192 (“By his own account, at least, Storey’s mother was an outright aboli-
tionist.”); M.A. DEWOLFE HOWE, PORTRAIT OF AN INDEPENDENT: MOORFIELD STOREY,
1845–1929, at 22–23 (1932) (discussing Storey’s youth).
72 See, e.g., HIXSON, supra note 9, at 43. R
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the sale of land to African-Americans violated the freedom of contract
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.73
Though his abolitionist forbearers had been Republicans, Storey
was something of an independent.  Indeed, in 1900 he ran for Con-
gress as a third-party independent candidate, on the platform “‘that
every man under the jurisdiction of the United States is entitled by law
to no less and no greater rights than we of Massachusetts hold.’”74  As
one newspaper editor noted in connection with his failed candidacy,
Storey had declared himself “ ‘against the Republicans on such ques-
tions as expansion and protection and against the Democrats on sil-
ver, suppression of the colored vote, reconstruction of the Supreme
Court and the other populistic ideas which have found approval in the
last two Democratic platforms.’”75  Though true to his complex ideals,
Storey’s views found few matches among voters and he won only seven
percent of the vote.76
Storey was active in the Anti-Imperialist League from the moment
of its inception.  He served as vice president of the New England Anti-
Imperialist League and eventually president of the American Anti-
Imperialist League beginning in 1905.77  Like other members of the
League, Storey thought that the maintenance of territorial empire was
inconsistent with the basic tenets of American self-governance and was
likely to destroy the republican fabric of the nation.78  Unlike some
others, however, Storey self-consciously linked a concern with racial
discrimination at home and abroad, seeing connections between the
treatment of Filipinos, African Americans, and inhabitants of Latin
America.79  In respect to the rights of inhabitants of the Philippines,
he said:
We insist that constitutional liberty shall be the inalienable right of
every man who owes allegiance to our flag; that freedom shall be-
long to man and not to place; that our Constitution shall be no
respecter of persons, colors, or races; that it shall recognize the
equal rights of all.80
Moreover, Storey argued:
No man of anti-slavery antecedents can fail to regard with horror
the treatment of the colored race in the South and the attempt to
disfranchise them. . . .  While, however, the President and the Re-
publican Party are denying the doctrine of human equality which
73 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
74 HIXSON, supra note 9, at 41. R
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 50–51.
78 See id. at 59.
79 Id. at 46.
80 Id. at 67.
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the party was formed to maintain, and are justifying conquest and
despotic methods in the Philippines and Porto Rico by the argu-
ment that the inhabitants of these islands are unfit for freedom
because of their race or color, it is only to be expected that the same
doctrines will be applied at home.81
Both Storey himself and the Anti-Imperialist League were critical
of the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Insular Cases.  Moreover, in
connection with the Anti-Imperialist League, Storey coauthored a re-
port on abuses by American troops in the Phillipines, including use of
water-boarding.82  Storey was also retained to represent a criminal de-
fendant named Adolphus Coulson in his appeal to the Supreme Court
raising the issue of application of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
persons in territories controlled by the United States.83  Storey’s cli-
ent, Coulson, was a West Indian laborer working on the construction
of the Panama Canal.84  Coulson confessed to poisoning his wife with
arsenic after a dispute with his mistress and was sentenced to death by
the Second Judicial Court for the Canal Zone.85  Coulson contested
his conviction, arguing that he was entitled to a jury trial under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution.  The Supreme
Court of the Canal Zone rejected his appeal, citing the recent Su-
preme Court decision in Dorr v. United States denying a jury trial to a
resident of the Philippines.86  The power of the United States to ac-
quire territory, the Court reasoned, includes the authority “to pre-
scribe upon what terms the United States will receive its inhabitants,
and what their status shall be in . . . [the] ‘American Empire.’”87  A
delegation of congressmen from the United States was in the Canal
Zone when the decision was announced.  They were “known as ‘stick-
lers for the rights of the Constitution’” and hired Storey to represent
Coulson.88  Even in Storey’s able legal hands, however, the suit was
unsuccessful as the Supreme Court dismissed the case “for want of
jurisdiction.”89
While many historians have suggested that the division between
those who favored American occupation of foreign territories and
81 Id. at 112.
82 MOORFIELD STOREY & JULIAN CODMAN, SECRETARY ROOT’S RECORD: “MARKED SEVERI-
TIES” IN PHILIPPINE WARFARE (1902).
83 See Coulson v. Gov’t of the Canal Zone, 212 U.S. 553, 553 (1908); see also JULIE
GREENE, THE CANAL BUILDERS: MAKING AMERICA’S EMPIRE AT THE PANAMA CANAL 267 (2009)
(discussing the lawyers’ argument that the Coulson trial violated the Fifth Amendment right
to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury).
84 GREENE, supra note 83, at 267.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 268.
87 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
88 See id.
89 Coulson v. Gov’t of the Canal Zone, 212 U.S. 553, 553 (1908).
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Anti-Imperialists was “over political control, both sides favoring eco-
nomic penetration,”90 in reality the views of both sides were more
complex.  Storey, for example, was actually opposed to American in-
vestment in the Philippines, doubting the motives of investors and
fearing the potential for exploitation and delayed independence.91  At
the same time, other members of the Anti-Imperialist League, such as
Andrew Carnegie, favored private economic engagement in foreign
territories and believed that unfettered access to markets would be
more easily pursued without territorial colonialism.92
Storey’s “advocacy on behalf of the Filipinos turned his attention
to other areas of American policy, such as Latin America,” where by
then “more sophisticated techniques of control were being developed
that avoided territorial annexation and relied instead on financial
control and military intervention.”93  Storey, for example, opposed
U.S. military intervention in Mexico to defend the property and secur-
ity of American business interests there.  Instead, he advocated for a
new rule of international law that:
[T]he citizens of every country understood that if they go into an-
other they must submit themselves to the government of that coun-
try, and take the justice which that country affords, that they cannot
claim in the country which they are visiting greater rights than the
citizens of that country themselves have.94
Having advocated for this position independently as a product of his
anti-imperialist views, Storey was a natural choice to defend the inter-
ests of the Boston-based United Fruit Company in a Supreme Court
case seeking to avoid extraterritorial application of American antitrust
laws to the company’s conduct in Latin America.
3. The United Fruit Company
The classic statement of the presumption against extraterritorial
application of federal statutes is the Supreme Court’s 1909 decision in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.95  Writing for the Court in that
case, Justice Holmes held that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not ap-
ply to the conduct of the Boston-based United Fruit Company in Latin
America.  In the course of the decision, Holmes pronounced the gen-
eral rule that “in case of doubt . . . any statute [should be construed]
90 HIXSON, supra note 9, at 65. R
91 Id.
92 See generally id. (noting that despite the tendency of historians to view both imperi-
alists and anti-imperialists as favoring international economic penetration, Moorfield Sto-
rey at times expressed opposition to economic investment and not just territorial and
political control).
93 Id. at 51.
94 Id. at 77 (citation omitted).
95 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over
which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.”96  While the
specific holding of American Banana with respect to the Sherman Anti-
trust Act was eroded by later decisions applying that particular statute
extraterritorially, the core of its holding on the statutory presumption
against extraterritoriality has come back with full force in recent deci-
sions including Kiobel and Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd.
Most legal scholars discussing the presumption against extraterri-
toriality briefly mention the colorful facts of American Banana, but al-
most none pay sustained attention to the context of the case.97  This is
surprising because the United Fruit Company is one of the most fa-
mous—and controversial—multinational corporations in world his-
tory.98  From its inception in 1899 to its corporate demise a century
later, the company influenced economic and political life in a broad
swath of Latin American countries.  In Latin American, it was some-
times referred to as El Pulpo, the octopus, reflecting the tentacle-like
reach of its influence.99  It bribed governments, held vast territories
under its near-exclusive control, orchestrated coups, killed labor or-
ganizers, and demanded the cooperation of armies.100  The Nobel
Prize–winning Chilean poet Pablo Neruda thought the company im-
portant enough to feature a poem about it in his Canto General, a po-
etic history of Latin America:
When the trumpet blared everything
on earth was prepared,
and Jehovah distributed the world
to Coca-Cola Inc., Anaconda,
Ford Motors and other entities:
United Fruit Inc.
reserved for itself the juiciest,
the central seaboard of my land,
96 Id. at 357.
97 See, e.g., John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L.
351, 366 n.95 (2010) (describing only American Banana’s ultimate claim before discussing
the presumption against extraterritoriality).
98 See, e.g., BANANA WARS: POWER, PRODUCTION, AND HISTORY IN THE AMERICAS (Steve
Striffler & Mark Moberg eds., 2003) (detailing the cultural, political, economic, and agri-
cultural processes involved in banana production in the Caribbean and Latin America);
MARCELO BUCHELI, BANANAS AND BUSINESS: THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY IN COLOMBIA,
1899–2000 (2005) (constructing a general and business history of the United Fruit Com-
pany using company records); PETER CHAPMAN, BANANAS: HOW THE UNITED FRUIT COM-
PANY SHAPED THE WORLD (2007) (overviewing the rise, operations, and ultimate fall of the
United Fruit Company); CHARLES DAVID KEPNER & JAY HENRY SOOTHILL, THE BANANA EM-
PIRE: A CASE STUDY OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM (1967) (discussing the United Fruit Com-
pany’s actions in Central America during the early twentieth century); THOMAS P. MCCANN,
AN AMERICAN COMPANY: THE TRAGEDY OF UNITED FRUIT (1976) (narrating author’s experi-
ence as an employee of United Fruit Company).
99 CHAPMAN, supra note 98, at 7–8.
100 See id. at 3.
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America’s sweet waist.
It rebaptized its lands
the “Banana Republics[]” . . .101
Another Nobel laureate, Gabriel Garcı́a Márquez, named the fictional
town in his seminal novel, One Hundred Years of Solitude, “Macondo”
after a United Fruit plantation and included in the novel a fictional-
ized version of the United Fruit Company’s 1928 massacre of labor
protestors in Colombia.102
In short, the United Fruit Company looms large in the collective
imagination of the region.  It is thus a felicitous coincidence—or, I
would suggest, not a coincidence at all—that the presumption against
extraterritoriality was announced in a case involving the very corpora-
tion viewed by many observers as the pernicious embodiment of a par-
ticular form of economic and private—rather than sovereign, public,
and territorial—imperialism.
But when complicated, idealistic Moorfield Storey took the case,
he used it as a platform to advance his vision of anti-imperialism—one
that tried to provide respect to the territorial sovereignty of other na-
tions.  Storey’s was a well-meaning, classically liberal vision, but one
that neglected to foresee the potential harm that unregulated and un-
accountable business enterprises could inflict in a transnational con-
text of weak and dysfunctional states and no coordinated
international regulation of private actors.103
As Justice Holmes summarized the allegations of the American Ba-
nana complaint, the United Fruit Company’s basic business strategy
involved monopoly control over the market for bananas:
[T]he defendant [United Fruit Company], with intent to prevent
competition and to control and monopolize the banana trade,
bought the property and business of several of its previous competi-
tors, with provision against their resuming the trade, made con-
tracts with others, including a majority of the most important,
regulating the quantity to be purchased and the price to be paid,
and acquired a controlling amount of stock in still others.  For the
same purpose it organized a selling company, of which it held the
stock, that by agreement sold at fixed prices all the bananas of the
combining parties.  By this and other means it did monopolize and
restrain the trade and maintained unreasonable prices.104
101 Pablo Neruda, United Fruit Co., in CANTO GENERAL 179 (Jack Schmitt trans., 1991).
102 GABRIEL GARCÍA MÁRQUEZ, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SOLITUDE 9 (Gregory Rabassa
trans., 1998); see also CHAPMAN, supra note 98, at 3 (noting Márquez’s use of the historical
strike in his novel).
103 Thanks to my colleague Bob Gordon for pointing out to me the puzzle of Moor-
field Storey’s role in the case.
104 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 354 (1909).
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The dispute that eventually reached the Supreme Court con-
cerned United Fruit’s efforts, with the help of various Latin American
governments, to exclude a competing banana company.  As the
Court’s opinion notes,105 the controversy began when a man named
McConnell purchased a banana plantation in a disputed border re-
gion of Colombia (which would soon become part of Panama, once
that country declared its independence).  As soon as United Fruit
learned of McConnell’s project, the company demanded that he ei-
ther combine with them or cease his involvement in the banana busi-
ness.  Ignoring its threats, McConnell began building a railroad from
the plantation to the coast, in order to get his bananas to port for
shipment to the United States.  Two months later—allegedly at the
United Fruit Company’s urging—the governor of Panama ordered
that the nation of Costa Rica be allowed to administer the territory
through which the railroad was to run, notwithstanding an arbitration
pursuant to treaty awarding that land to Colombia.  The Costa Rican
government, under the influence of the United Fruit Company, then
proceeded to thwart the construction of the railroad.
Under the guidance of President Theodore Roosevelt (who
hoped for control over the planned canal that would cut through the
territory of Panama), the United States abetted the coup d’état that
precipitated Panamanian independence in November 1903.  (Moor-
field Storey, in his role with the Anti-Imperialist League, gave a speech
denouncing the United States’s role in the Panamanian coup as a fur-
ther example of unfortunate imperialist conduct.)106  In June 1904,
McConnell sold his operation to the American Banana Company, an
upstart rival based in New Orleans.107  It proved not to be a good in-
vestment for the American Banana Company, for by July, Costa Rican
military forces (again, allegedly acting at the request of the United
Fruit Company) seized the plantation and stopped construction of the
railroad.108
The battle then turned to the courts, as American Banana sued
United Fruit in the United States under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Eventually the case reached the Supreme Court, where Moorfield Sto-
rey (along with colleagues) appeared as counsel for United Fruit.109
Storey’s arguments were consistent with his broader anti-imperialist
commitments and framed the case as involving imperialism in the ap-
105 Id.
106 Moorfield Storey, The Recognition of Panama, Address at the Massachusetts Re-
form Club (Dec. 5, 1903), in MOORFIELD STOREY, THE RECOGNITION OF PANAMA 3 (1904).
107 Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 354.
108 Id. at 354–55.
109 See id. at 352 (listing Moorfield Storey as counsel for the defendant, United Fruit
Company).
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plication of American antitrust law to the conduct of even an Ameri-
can corporation overseas.
The opinion for the Court was assigned to Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes.110  As part of social life in upper-class Boston, Holmes was
apparently friends with Storey, who was part of the same informal de-
bating club.111  But regardless of any social ties, Holmes seemingly ac-
cepted and incorporated some of Storey’s anti-imperialist arguments
into his opinion.  Calling the plaintiff’s position “startling,” Holmes
explained that:
No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to
no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such
countries may treat some relations between their citizens as gov-
erned by their own law, and keep to some extent the old notion of
personal sovereignty alive. . . .  But the general and almost universal
rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done.112
Moreover, Holmes asserted,
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor,
to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the
place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be
an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to
the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might
resent.113
In this case, Holmes continued,
[N]ot only were the acts of the defendant in Panama or Costa Rica
not within the Sherman Act, but they were not torts by the law of
the place and therefore were not torts at all, however contrary to
the ethical and economic postulates of that statute.  The substance
of the complaint is that, the plantation being within the de facto ju-
risdiction of Costa Rica, that state took and keeps possession of it by
virtue of its sovereign power.  But a seizure by a state is not a thing
that can be complained of elsewhere in the courts.114
In conclusion, Holmes announced the rule now known as the
presumption against extraterritoriality: “The foregoing considerations
would lead in case of doubt to a construction of any statute as in-
tended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial
limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.  ‘All
110 See id. at 359.
111 See HIXSON, supra note 9, at 32. R
112 Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 355–56 (citations omitted).
113 Id. at 356 (citations omitted).
114 Id. at 357–58.  Here the Court cited Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897),
concerning the so-called Act of State doctrine.
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legislation is prima facie territorial.’”115 American Banana, then, is a de-
cision rooted in a particular kind of liberal anti-imperialist thought.
While notions of territoriality were not novel or unprecedented in
conflict of laws doctrine,116 the particular articulation of them in this
case—and thus the formulation of the presumption against extraterri-
toriality—was steeped in the context of early twentieth century anti-
imperialism.  Ironically, however, by placing the emphasis on formal
territorial and public sovereignty, the decision enabled multinational
corporations like United Fruit—nominally private actors—to exercise
and abuse strong de facto power in regions with underdeveloped pub-
lic authority.  Laissez-faire conceptions of the dichotomy between
state and market, combined with this naı̈ve kind of anti-imperialism,
turned out to have pernicious effects.
Unfettered by antitrust laws or other constraining regulations,
the United Fruit Company itself was able to extend and maintain its
monopoly not only over American Banana’s lands but also eventually
throughout broad swaths of the territory of Latin America, thereby
creating the so-called “banana republics.”117  The company gained a
reputation for corruption and violence in its efforts to control local
governments and maintain its monopoly.118  Had Moorfield Storey
foreseen the abuses that would be carried out by the United Fruit
Company, then Storey the anti-imperialist, the civil rights activist, and
the corporate lawyer might not have been able to so easily coexist.
II
CORPORATIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
In fact, the role of United Fruit in Latin America was not unprec-
edented in international relations.  In an earlier period, European na-
tions had also outsourced empire to business enterprises.  An
important predecessor of the modern business corporation was the
joint stock company, which flourished with European exploration,
trade, and expansion in the seventeenth century.119  When the
Netherlands granted the Dutch East India Company (also known as
the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or “VOC”) a monopoly on trade
with Asia in 1602, the Amsterdam stock exchange grew up to facilitate
115 Id. at 357.
116 See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825) (“No principle of gen-
eral law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of nations. . . .  It
results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another.  Each legis-
lates for itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone.”); id. at 123 (“The Courts of no
country execute the penal laws of another . . . .”).
117 See BUCHELI, supra note 98, at 3.
118 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
119 See LARRY NEAL, THE RISE OF FINANCIAL CAPITALISM: INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MAR-
KETS IN THE AGE OF REASON 44–45 (1990).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-6\CRN604.txt unknown Seq: 23 22-SEP-14 10:34
2014] NEW TERRITORIALISM AND OLD TERRITORIALISM 1409
the sale of shares in the company.120  Queen Elizabeth had granted a
similar monopoly to the English East India Company two years ear-
lier.121  In the early modern period, chartered trading companies of
this sort were numerous: the Royal African Company, the Dutch West
India Company, the French East India Company, the Portuguese East
India Company, the Virginia Company, the Massachusetts Bay Com-
pany, the Hudson’s Bay Company, and the Real Compañia de Comer-
cio de Barcelona, to name just a few.  These companies played such
an essential role in European expansion that the “early modern Euro-
pean overseas empires . . . more often than not were pioneered and
governed not by states alone but in cooperation and competition with
a medley of companies and corporations, conquistadores, explorers, pri-
vateers, proprietors, and itinerant merchant, family, and religious
networks.”122
Obviously, the trading companies served an economic function,
engaging in the purchase, transportation, and sale of goods.  The pro-
ceeds enriched investors, and sometimes the governments of the
countries that had chartered them.  Moreover, their economic struc-
ture was of a particular form.  Monopoly was the name of the game in
this period.  Economic historian and theorist Emma Rothschild has
described the ways in which the economic and colonial structures va-
ried by geographic region.  In America, “each empire attempted to
exclude the merchants of all other nations from its own colonies”
while in the East Indies “the empires attempted to exclude all
merchants other than those of a single, privileged company.”123
But the trading companies often served a governance function as
well, acting “in a dual capacity, as commercial organizations as well as
bearers of sovereign powers delegated to them in their charters.”124
In so doing, they exercised what we would view today as unusual com-
binations of public and private functions.  As one political scientist
observes, “[w]ith these curious institutions, all analytical distinc-
tions—between the economic and political, nonstate and state, prop-
erty rights and sovereignty, the public and private—broke down.”125
120 See STEPHEN R. BOWN, MERCHANT KINGS: WHEN COMPANIES RULED THE WORLD 27
(2009).
121 PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EARLY
MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 7 (2011).  When founded, the com-
pany was originally called the “Governor and Company of Merchants of London, Trading
into the East-Indies.” Id.
122 Id. at 10.
123 Emma Rothschild, Global Commerce and the Question of Sovereignty in the Eighteenth-
Century Provinces, 1 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 3, 9 (2004).
124 C.H. ALEXANDROWICZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
IN THE EAST INDIES 27 (1967).
125 JANICE E. THOMSON, MERCENARIES, PIRATES, AND SOVEREIGNS: STATE-BUILDING AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 32 (1994).
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The Dutch East India Company’s charter, for example, gave it author-
ity “ ‘to make war, conclude treaties, acquire territories and build for-
tresses,’”126 and the English East India Company exercised similar
powers.  As the same scholar notes, “[t]hese companies made treaties
with each other and with foreign governments, governed subjects of
their home states, raised armies, and even coined their own
money.”127  The governors-general of the companies in India even set
up “quasi-royal courts on the Asian pattern.”128
In his recent book, historian Philip Stern describes the English
East India Company as a hybrid entity: a “company-state.”129  Stern
argues that not just the East India Company, but other trading compa-
nies like it, were
far more than intermediary bodies or outsourced, privatized exten-
sions of the state.  In early modern parlance, they were themselves
forms of “commonwealth,” bodies politic responsible for governing
over the economic, political, religious, and cultural life of those
under their charge, with their own claims to property, rights, and
immunities at law that generated claims to jurisdiction, allegiance,
and subjects and citizens.130
Scholars Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross suggest that
“[c]orporations were not only economic entities.”  Corporations
“oversaw religion, justice, and education; they conducted diplomacy
and fought wars; and at times they spawned a ‘public sphere’ that pro-
vided a focus for sociability and allegiance.”131  Moreover, the work of
these scholars suggests that “[e]mphasizing the resemblance of over-
seas companies to a commonwealth writ small questions the conven-
tional hierarchical distinction between supposedly superior states and
dependent corporations.”132
As Stern notes, the carrying out of governance functions by trad-
ing companies in the context of empire was hardly aberrational in
light of the understanding of the corporate form at the time: “[w]hile
today the term [corporation] perhaps most immediately calls to mind
an economic firm, a corporation as a legal and political idea was far
broader and far more public in its nature” in the early modern pe-
riod, when corporations formed the basis for “cities and
126 Id. at 10–11.
127 Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
128 ALEXANDROWICZ, supra note 124, at 37.
129 STERN, supra note 121, at 6.
130 Philip J. Stern, “Bundles of Hyphens”: Corporations as Legal Communities in the Early
Modern British Empire, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES, 1500–1850, at 21 (Lauren Benton
& Richard J. Ross eds., 2013).
131 Lauren Benton & Richard J. Ross, Jurisdiction, Sovereignty, and Political Imagination in
the Early Modern World, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES, supra note 130, at 7.
132 Id.
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towns[,] . . . churches and religious organizations, schools, learned
societies, hospitals, charity organizations, professional and voluntary
associations,” as well as business enterprises.133
Examining the practice not only in India, but also in the Western
Hemisphere, Stern concludes that “corporate and proprietary govern-
ment was the rule, not the exception, in shaping the early English
Atlantic plantation and promoting and protecting its legal and politi-
cal integrity.”134  In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, then,
companies were a common tool in the construction of European
empire.135
As Emma Rothschild explains, “disputes over sovereignty and
global commerce in the 1760s and 1770s” were tied up with percep-
tions of trading companies and their impact.  She writes:
The economists of the time, including Turgot, Mirabeau, Dupont
de Nemours, Baudeau and Adam Smith, were also intensely inter-
ested in the merchant sovereigns of the French, English and Dutch
East India companies, and in the new colonial ventures of the post-
Seven Years War period. . . .  [Their] writings on global connections
were the occasion for some of their most profound reflections on
the political consequences of laissez-faire, on theories of sover-
eignty, on the difficulties of transporting information or instruc-
tions over very large distances, and on the changing relationships
between power, law and commerce.  The disputes over long-dis-
tance commerce provide an interesting insight . . . into ways of
thinking which were at the same time scientific and administrative,
global and provincial.136
Adam Smith, of course, was particularly critical of the monopolies
that had been granted to the trading companies: “[o]f all the ex-
pedients that can well be contrived to stunt the natural growth of a
new colony, that of an exclusive company is undoubtedly the most
effectual.”137  Moreover, he contended, the vesting of sovereign power
in the companies was a further disaster, for companies could never
manage a country in the best interests of its residents as a whole.  As
Smith explained:
133 Stern, supra note 130, at 22.
134 Philip Stern, Corporate Virtue: The Languages of Empire in Early Modern British Asia, 26
RENAISSANCE STUD. 510, 512 (2012).
135 See Stern, supra note 130, at 27–28.
136 Rothschild, supra note 123, at 3.
137 ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 156 (Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Books 1999)
(1776); see also Emma Rothschild & Amartya Sen, Adam Smith’s Economics, in THE CAM-
BRIDGE COMPANION TO ADAM SMITH 319, 342 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2006) (summarizing
Smith’s arguments against exclusive company rule of colonies); Sankar Muthu, Adam
Smith’s Critique of International Trading Companies: Theorizing “Globalization” in the Age of En-
lightenment, 36 POL. THEORY 185 (2008).
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[A] company of merchants are, it seems, incapable of considering
themselves as sovereigns, even after they have become such.  Trade,
or buying in order to sell again, they still consider as their principal
business, and by a strange absurdity regard the character of the sov-
ereign as but an appendix to that of the merchant . . . .  Their mer-
cantile habits draw them in this manner . . . to prefer upon all
ordinary occasions the little and transitory profit of the monopolist
to the great and permanent revenue of the sovereign . . . .138
It was this set of perverse incentives that led the Dutch to burn large
portions of the spice crop to avoid reducing prices at which they could
sell them in Europe.139  In summary, Smith suggested, “[a]s sover-
eigns their interest is exactly the same with that of the country which
they govern,” but “[a]s merchants their interest is directly opposite to
that interest.”140  The problem, in Smith’s view, was not just that the
state was meddling in the marketplace or that trading companies en-
joyed state-granted monopolies; it was that the trading companies per-
vasively used their economic and political power to distort the
functioning of government.141  And government by corporation was
not good government.142
The point is not that corporations (or capitalism itself) are some-
how bad.  Rather, the point is that both public and private interna-
tional law have not adequately grappled with the problem of
transnational regulation of large multinational corporations, and that
part of the reason for this failure is the heavy reliance of both fields on
concepts of territoriality and state-centric sovereignty.  What I mean to
suggest with this brief foray into history is not that history provides any
answer, but rather that this is not a new issue; it is quite an old one
that has been resolved at different times and places in different ways,
but that still evades a completely satisfactory solution.
Corporations are today considered quintessentially private ac-
tors.143  Yet many of the largest corporations economically dwarf
smaller states.  Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum, for example, had reve-
nues in 2012 of $484 billion, making it the number one company on
Fortune’s Global 500 list.144  Indeed, to return to the scene of the
138 SMITH, supra note 137, at 222–23.
139 Id. at 220.
140 Id. at 223.
141 See Muthu, supra note 137, at 188–89.
142 Of course, Marxist thinkers also took a dim view of the role of corporations in
empire. See, e.g., VLADIMIR LENIN, IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (1917).
But, as Smith’s writings show, one can be basically in favor of capitalism and yet concerned
about the status and regulation of corporations in global governance.
143 See Joel Slawotsky, Corporate Liability in Alien Tort Litigation, 1 VA. J. INT’L LAW ON-
LINE 27, 29 (2011) (noting the “general presumption that a corporation should be treated
as any other private actor”).
144 See Global 500: Our Annual Ranking of the World’s Largest Corporations, CNN MONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/full_list/ (last visited Apr. 1,
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events in the Kiobel case, Nigeria has a gross domestic product (GDP)
of $262 billion dollars, slightly more than half of Shell’s annual reve-
nues.145  According to the World Bank’s 2012 listing of countries by
GDP, 165 countries had a GDP smaller than Shell’s annual revenues.146
Some 65 corporations on the Fortune list had annual revenues of
$100 billion or more, while only 60 nations had a GDP in 2012 in
excess of $100 billion.147  Some 365 corporations had annual revenues
in excess $20 billion, while 102 countries had a GDP of less than that
amount.148  Obviously, these statistics are influenced by the fact that
there are a large number of relatively small nations; the wealth of cor-
porations cannot match that of large economic powers like the United
States, the European Union, or China.  But these statistics highlight
the oddity of a central feature of international law: all states are, in
theory, equal subjects of international law.  Corporations are not.
And territoriality is one of the defining features of statehood.149
States, no matter how weak and small, are bound to and defined by
territory; corporations are not.  The resurgence of territoriality in pri-
vate international law through cases like Kiobel is another instantiation
of the same basic problem.150  The two questions in Kiobel—whether
corporations are in some sense “subjects” of public international law
(in the form of human rights law) and the extraterritorial application
of the ATS—are not unrelated but are actually two sides of the same
coin.  What is the basic structure of the international order?
2014).  Gross revenues and GDP may not be the most comparable of measures, but I do
not intend an exact comparison. I am making a broad-textured argument that does not
depend on literal comparability.
145 GDP Data, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
(last visited Apr. 1, 2014); see also CNN MONEY, supra note 144 (listing Shell’s annual reve-
nue for 2012). Cf. Carol R. Goforth, “A Corporation Has No Soul”—Modern Corporations,
Corporate Governance, and Involvement in the Political Process, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 617, 618 (2010)
(noting similar statistics for 2009).
146 WORLD BANK, supra note 145.  Twenty-four countries had GDP equal to or greater
than Shell’s revenues.
147 Gross domestic product is the value of all final goods and services produced in a
country in a given year. See, e.g., Glossary, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/
depweb/english/beyond/global/glossary.html#34 (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
148 See CNN MONEY, supra note 144; WORLD BANK, supra note 145.
149 See, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
128 (8th ed. 2012) (listing “defined territory” as one of several legal criteria of statehood).
150 Cf. Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991
SUP. CT. REV. 179, 181, 184 (1991) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s revival of the American
Banana presumption against extraterritoriality in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.
(Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991), and suggesting that “the world in which a presumption
against extraterritoriality made sense is gone—and for good reasons”).
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Experience shows, sadly, that any kind of concentrated and un-
regulated power—even if in nominally private form—can be danger-
ous.151  Add to this the classic legal realist point that formal legal
categories (like the focus on territories under the power of a particu-
lar sovereign) can obscure actual power and political dynamics under-
lying a given dispute.  In a legal world governed by territorial
formalism, entities (like corporations) that lack corporeal and territo-
rial forms can too easily escape necessary regulation.  Just as the Ameri-
can Banana decision a century ago helped facilitate the United Fruit
Company’s unwholesome dominance of Latin America, the Kiobel de-
cision threatens to leave corporations unaccountable for their con-
duct today.  The new territorialism looks a lot like the old
territorialism, and that is, indeed, unfortunate.  At the dawn of a new
century, these problems deserve new and better solutions.
151 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 281 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (“This
policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be
traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public.  We see it
particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power; where the constant aim
is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on
the other; that the private interest of every individual may be a centinel over the public
rights.  These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the
supreme powers of the state.”).
